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Abstract
Focusing on the MBE (meeting or beating analysts’ forecast) phenomenon, 
this study primarily investigates the way market responds to a firm’s 
repeated MBE and to its first failure to meet analysts’ forecast after a 
long string of MBE. The paper also asks whether the market’s reaction to 
the MBE patterns has changed after the regulatory reform including the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and investigates the properties of habitual MBE firms. 
The results show the market rewards persistent MBE firms and that it 
seems to efficiently interpret a systematic portion of earnings surprise for 
habitual beaters. They also document that the post-SOX stock market 
premium to MBE has not completely diminished and that MBE patterns are 
strongly associated with firm characteristics.
Keywords: Analysts’ forecasts, earnings management, forecast 
management, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, firm characteristics
*    The author appreciates and wishes to thank his adviser, Peter Easton, for his 
professional guidance and support. He expresses special thanks to Jinhan Pae 
for his invaluable insights and advice. The author  gratefully acknowledges the 
helpful comments from Richard Dietrich, Kirk Philipich, Siew Hong Teoh, Keji 
Chen, Greg Sommers, Randal Smith, Hyesun Lee, Martina Sipkova, Jeffrey Mar-
tin, and seminar participants at the Ohio State University and the KDI School of 
Public Policy.
**    Associate Professor, KDI School of Public Policy and Management, 207-43 Chun-
gnyang, Dongdaemun, Seoul 130-868, Korea (Tel.: 82-2-3299-1221; fax:  82-2-
3299-1240; E-mail address: TChoi@kdischool.ac.kr)
4 Seoul Journal of Business
iNTRoDUCTioN
The study is motivated by anecdotal evidence that firms often 
cave into pressure to achieve MBE by managing their earnings and 
the market’s expectations through spinning earnings forecasts they 
provide to analysts. This kind of behavior implies questions as to 
the reliability of the information offered by the companies and also 
raises doubts concerning their real performance.1) Furthermore, 
it highlights the need to understand better the patterns which 
can be observed in the firms’ behavior, its changes in response to 
new regulatory reforms such as the passing of the SOX, and the 
connection to firms’ specific features. Due to the practical nature 
of these issues and their strong influence on major financial and 
investment decisions, the study and its results are aimed to be used 
not only by academics but also practitioners involved in financial 
markets. 
In view of the accounting scandals in the early 2000s and 
subsequent changes in regulatory environment, the study looks into 
the phenomenon of MBE from several viewpoints. Investigating the 
MBE pattern and its association with earnings response coefficient, 
the study examines market response to the MBE repetition and the 
way the market reacts to the firm’s first failure to MBE. Apart from 
that, the paper also investigates firms’ characteristics and their 
relationship to the MBE patterns and briefly examines the post-SOX 
changes in comparison to the previous period.
In the face of stiffened global competition, managers find 
themselves under more pressure to meet or beat analysts’ forecast 
than in the past, and thus often resort to improper behavior to 
avoid disappointing market’s expectations.2) Prior articles in the 
  1) For example, Fox (1991) and Fox (2002) provided anecdotal evidence of earnings 
management to avoid market disappointment conducted through write-offs.  In 
relation to the same topic, Kahn (2001) reported: “… GE never seems to have 
had a loss in one division that wasn’t happily offset by a gain in another; it never 
seems to have encountered a windfall profit that wasn’t smoothed away by a “one 
time” restructuring charge. 
  2) In this context, SEC chairman Levitt (1998) also made the following remarks re-
garding the associated punishment for the missing forecasts: 
 “I recently read of one major U.S. company that failed to meet its so-called “num-
ber” by one penny, and lost more than six percent of its stock value in one day.... 
This is the pattern earnings management creates: companies try to meet or beat 
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financial press report that accounting scandals at previously 
respected corporations including Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, 
Adelphia, and Arthur Andersen were often caused by the MBE 
phenomenon. The accounting scandals have only served to heighten 
public awareness of financial issues, bringing them further into 
the market participants’ consciousness. Increasing pressure to 
enhance transparency and trustworthiness of reported financial 
results finally led to changes in the regulatory environment. Most 
prominent of the resulting reforms was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
passed in 2002. Yet, despite considerable effort of various regulatory 
institutions to improve the climate prevailing in the financial 
markets, earnings and forecasts management are believed to persist 
on an unacceptably large scale. Since the prevalence of earnings 
and/or forecast management is not directly observable, I use the 
systematic patterns of MBE as a proxy for evidence of earnings 
management and/or firm-provided guidance of analysts’ forecasts. 
The underlying assumption is that firms exhibiting repeated success 
in MBE are more likely to have engaged in earnings and/or forecast 
management to exceed the market’s expectation of earnings as 
achieving repeated MBE is very difficult.3) 
Existing literature dealing with the MBE documents that since 
the early 1990’s the number of firms persistently achieving MBE 
has been growing. Previous studies have provided evidence that 
managers’ desire to exceed the market expectations, or, conversely, 
reduce negative earnings surprises, has become one of the important 
incentives for them to engage in earnings management (Brown 1999, 
2001; Brown and Caylor 2005; DeFond and Park 1997; DeGeorge, 
Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999; Lopez and Rees 2002; Matsumoto 
1999; Payne and Robb 2000). In line with considerable anecdotal 
evidence in the popular press speaking of downward guidance of 
analysts’ forecasts as a means of MBE, Cohen (1991) posits that 
managers engage in forecast management. Articles and media also 
often speak of so-called ‘earnings game’ between company managers 
as information providers and analysts or investors as information 
users. While company managers motivated to MBE may resort to 
Wall Street earnings projections in order to grow market capitalization and in-
crease the value of stock.”
  3) Charan and Colvin (2001) observed that only about 5% of the S&P 500 compa-
nies have successfully met or beaten Wall Street’s consensus earnings forecast 
every quarter for the past five years. 
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earnings management or downward guidance, analysts aware of 
various techniques used for this purpose incorporate this knowledge 
in their forecasts. In view of that, it is extremely difficult to meet or 
beat analysts’ forecasts repeatedly as analysts may refuse to follow 
managers’ downward guidance and raise earnings projections.4) 
The way managers engage in expectations management has been 
investigated by a number of researches (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 
2002; Brown and Higgins 2005; Burgstahler and Eames 1999, 
2006; Matsumoto 1999). It is also interesting to note that even 
though investors are aware of earnings manipulation by managers 
(companies), they do not pay considerable attention to this issue 
as long as the company meets or beats expectations5). Fox (1997) 
suggests that that one of the possible reasons for the popularity 
of firms beating expectations despite the likelihood of earnings 
management may be the easy predictability of earnings of such 
companies. Another explanation might be the increasing focus on 
earnings as the key number to evaluate company’s performance by 
the market (Graham, 2005; Habib, 2007). 
Despite a plethora of studies related to MBE, there has been 
relatively little research on whether the market rewards the firms 
that exceed the expectations with prior history of beating them 
(Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002). Considering 
such research background, this study examines the phenomenon of 
MBE in several contexts. 
First, as market’s systematic response to MBE has not yet been 
discussed in this form, the study investigates the way market reacts 
to MBE repetition and asks whether the market penalizes a firm’s 
first failure to meet analysts’ forecasts after a long series of MBE. 
Table 1 presents the case of Cisco Systems, which in February 2001 
  4) In relation to this issue, Cohen (1991) says: “But low-balling may not work forev-
er. That’s the conclusion that some analysts draw from the case of AST Research 
Inc. For more than five quarters, several analysts and money managers say, the 
Irvine, Calif., computer maker consistently led them to believe it would earn at 
least five cents a share less than the actual results. But for this year’s first quar-
ter, analysts lifted their projections, running far ahead of the company’s “guid-
ance”.”
  5) Investors’ attitude can be illustrated by quoting a Boston Chicken CFO Mart 
Stephens, who said about his company: “a byproduct of where we are with the 
structure is that we have a public entity with an earnings complexion that is at-
tractive” and he also adds: “It’s like a sausage. I love the product; just don’t show 
me how it’s made.” (Fox, 1997).
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missed the analysts’ forecast by a penny for the first time in more 
than three years, resulting in a 13% tumble in its market price 
in the next two days. Cisco Systems can serve as an example of 
many cases that the market price of stock fell significantly after a 
Table 1. Example: Persistence Pattern and Earnings Surprise of CISCO 
Systems















































































































































































Notes to table 1: 
EAD =  earnings announcement date; 
EAD−1 = one day prior earnings announcement;
EAD+1 = one day after earnings announcement;
QT   = fiscal quarter; 
t   denotes day;
epsa   =  actual earnings per share; 
epsf  =  forecasted earnings per share; 
es  =  earnings surprise = epsa  − epsf; 
Rt  =  raw return at EADt; 
*  =   analysts’ forecast is met after rounding up the number to the nearest 
cent.
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company missed analysts’ forecasts by a few cents. It follows that 
managers have a strong incentive to take actions to maintain their 
MBE patterns. Hence, the ERCs are estimated when the firms miss 
analysts’ forecasts for the first time. In addition, I also look into how 
the market premium assigned to the MBE firms dissipates after the 
first earnings shock. 
Second, I test whether the market’s reaction to the patterns 
of MBE has changed after the regulatory reform including the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In doing so, I further split the persistent MBE 
firms into a pre-SOX and a post-SOX sample. Koh et al. (2007) 
documented that in the post scandals period managers tend to 
meet or beat analysts’ forecasts less often and that the stock market 
premium to small MBE has disappeared. He also showed that 
while investors are skeptical about MBE firms and the expectation 
management has increased, managers continue to be concerned 
with MBE. Apart from conventional arguments, in contrast to Koh 
et al. (2007), I found that even though the stock market premium to 
MBE has decreased in the post-SOX period, it has not completely 
diminished. 
Third, the study investigates the properties of firms repeatedly 
MBE and the association of these properties with the security 
market. While prior literature provides evidence that the market 
adjusts analysts’ forecasts on the basis of a company’s historical 
tendency of MBE (Lopez and Rees 2002), we examine the 
relationship between firms’ characteristics and the security market 
by asking whether habitual MBE firms are rewarded by the market. 
The effects of MBE patterns6) on related factors are captured by the 
differences in the earnings response coefficients (henceforth ERC), 
which are, according to previous studies (Collins and Kothari 1989; 
Easton and Zmijewski 1989; Kormendi and Lipe 1987), a decreasing 
function of risk and an increasing function of earnings persistence. 
Last, I focus on the relations between firms’ characteristics and 
MBE patterns. Prior studies document that MBE companies show 
different characteristics relative to companies reporting negative 
earnings surprises (Matsumoto 2002). In view of that, an MBE 
pattern can be systematically related to firms’ characteristics 
including the estimate of cost-of-capital, industry membership, 
  6) By MBE pattern I mean an uninterrupted repetition of MBE for several consecu-
tive periods.
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book-to-market ratio, long-term growth, or the dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. A model identifying firms with a 
predilection for earnings misrepresentation would serve as a tool 
to warn investors to consider the possibility of earnings or forecast 
management in their assessments of such firms. Identifying 
precisely what characteristics are indicative of earnings and forecast 
management is an important first step in creating such a model. 
Thus, conducting research into MBE patterns together with other 
related factors and identification of shared characteristics of firms 
that have achieved long strings of MBE is one of the important aims 
of the study. 
Consistent with anecdotal evidence, I found that the market seems 
to efficiently interpret a systematic pattern of earnings surprise as a 
firm persistently achieves MBE. After controlling for the systematic 
portion of earnings surprise, earnings response coefficients 
are higher for such firms. I also document that ERCs to the 
unsystematic portion of earnings surprise are almost monotonically 
increasing with the length of time of successful MBE and that firms 
with long MBE pattern are penalized more severely when they first 
miss market expectations. 
From the inter-period comparison of a pre-SOX and a post-SOX 
subsample, I found that even though in the post-SOX period the 
stock market premium to MBE has decreased, it continues to exist. 
The findings also show that similarly to a pre-SOX period, after SOX 
came into effect the premium on both systematic earnings surprise 
and unsystematic earnings surprise is stronger for habitual MBE 
firms. 
I have also detected a strong association between the patterns 
of MBE and firm characteristics. Market capitalization, long-term 
growth, price-to-book, average dollar volume for the previous year, 
average daily turnover for the previous year, momentum, and 
Tobin’s q are positively associated with the length of time of MBE. 
Conversely, dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, debt-to-book, standard 
deviation of daily returns, and beta are negatively associated with 
the patterns. 
RESEARCH DESiGN
The study first uses the earnings response coefficient (ERC) to 
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identify MBE related factors, and investigates the ERC association 
with the MBE patterns. After that, the findings are used to ascertain 
whether the market rewards the firms with repeated MBE. 
Based on their history of MBE, ERCs and risk characteristics 
are provided for portfolios of stocks constructed on the basis of 
the number of quarters for which earnings surprises (esjt, earnings 
surprise of a company j at time t) are greater or equal to zero, and 
serve to determine whether the ERCs and other characteristics 
are associated with the length of MBE repetition. If a firm MBE 
q consecutive quarters, the firm is assigned to portfolio Pq.
7) The 
observations of MBE for more than ten consecutive quarters are 
included in the portfolio P10.
8)
To estimate ERCs, the three-day market adjusted returns 
surrounding the earnings announcements are regressed on the 
earnings surprises. I calculate three-day raw and market adjusted 
returns around the quarterly earnings announcement date. The 
market adjusted return is the cumulative return less the cumulative 
equally weighted market return over the three-day window (the 
same analysis was also conducted using a five-day as well as a nine-
day window). For each observation, the earnings variable is defined 
as actual earnings, ajteps . Earnings surprise (esjt) is measured as the 
actual earnings per share ( ajteps ) less the most recent mean forecast 
( fjteps ) prior to the earnings announcement of the quarter from the I/
B/E/S database.9) 
Consistent with prior studies, I hypothesize that if market 
interprets persistent MBE as a positive signal about firm specific 
risk, growth, and/or persistence, the ERCs will show a significant 
positive association with the pattern. Supposing the persistent 
MBE pattern is a proxy inversely related to uncertainty, firms 
with persistent MBE will have higher ERCs.10) Similarly, if the 
  7) For example, if a firm had met or beaten analysts’ forecasts seven consecutive 
quarters at the end of the fourth quarter in 1995, the observation is included in 
the portfolio P7, even though the firm may or may not have met or beaten ana-
lysts’ forecasts again in the next quarter. The argument behind this manner of 
construction is that ex ante the market did not know whether or not the firms 
included in the portfolio would meet or beat analysts’ forecasts again in the next 
quarter.
  8) I also conducted the analysis using various periods. The result was qualitatively 
similar.
  9) Results are qualitatively similar when I/B/E/S median estimates are used.
10) Imhoff and Lobo (1992) found that firms with relatively less ex ante uncertainty 
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market expects a higher growth rate for firms that MBE, growth 
rates for habitual MBE firms should increase with MBE repetition. 
Finally, since future cash flows can be regarded as a function 
of future earnings, the persistence of current earnings surprise 
will affect expected future earnings and revise the expectation of 
future dividends, and ERC will thus be positively correlated with 
the persistence of earnings surprise. If MBE is a proxy for the 
persistence of earnings surprises, habitual beaters will have higher 
ERCs. MBE firms may have lower uncertainty in future cash flows 
as they are more likely to MBE repeatedly, so I also expect a negative 
association between the MBE pattern and firms’ systematic risk. In 
summary, if the MBE pattern is a proxy for these factors, the ERCs 
are a function of the MBE pattern. 
The basic hypothesis of the first regression (regression equation 
1) is that the difference in ERCs between partitions is driven by 
a different response to earnings news. It should be noted that 
this regression equation tests whether the market revises its 
expectations based on how many times a firm achieves MBE. Non-
negative earnings surprises are likely to persistently repeat for firms 
with a historical tendency to report them. If MBE is associated 
with a proxy of risk, the market may react more strongly to the 
same level of earnings surprise with continuous MBE since the risk 
would decrease as the firms persistently MBE. Similarly, if MBE 
is correlated with growth and/or persistence, the price response 
would be stronger for firms that MBE. Both, the size effects and the 
expected growth of companies are controlled for by including market 
value (MV) and beginning-of-quarter market-to-book ratio (MB), 
respectively (Atiase 1985; Atiase, Bamber, and Tse 1987). Beginning-
of-year asset-to-book ratio (FLV) is also accounted for to control for 
the financial leverage of the company (Atiase, Platt, and Tse 2004). 
Anecdotal evidence shows that the market efficiently expects 
earnings surprise for firms with persistent MBE and punishes the 
firms showing systematic behavior.11) For example, knowing that 
CISCO systems continued to beat earnings estimates by one penny 
for 13 quarters, the market was able to anticipate the pattern. In 
in earnings have large earnings response coefficients.
11) For example, Vicker (1999) noted: “Microsoft, which has also beaten the Street’s 
earnings estimates in every one of the last 12 quarters, rallies 75% of the time in 
the week before it reports profits. But once earnings are out, the stock is down 
about half of the time.”
12 Seoul Journal of Business
such cases, the market systematically expects the firms to beat by 
one penny in the next quarter as well. To test whether the market 
sees through the systematic amount of beating based on the past 
pattern of a firm, I split unexpected earnings into a systematic 
component of unexpected earnings and an unsystematic component 
of unexpected earnings. I defined the systematic component of 
unexpected earnings as essys, i.e. the mean of earnings surprise 
for the past four quarters.12) The slope coefficient βq explains the 
different reactions to the same degree of earnings surprise. If the 
market does not discount the systematic component of earnings 
surprise, the coefficients on essys should be significantly positive. 
In such case, I predict that β2 < β3 < ··· < β9 < β10 (where β1 + βq 
represents the ERC for the systematic component of earnings 
surprise for portfolio Pq) and that the coefficients will be statistically 
significant from zero.13) If the coefficients are insignificant or 
negative, the results will suggest the market discounts the 
systematic behavior of persistent MBE. In addition, the earnings 
response coefficients on esunsys will show an increasing pattern 
as firms persistently meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Should the 
coefficients on esunsys exhibit a rising pattern, it would suggest the 
market reward for the earnings surprise after controlling for the 
anticipated systematic portion of earnings surprise is greater for 
firms with persistent MBE. In such case, I predict that γ2 < γ3 < ··· 
< γ9 < γ10 (where γ1 + γq represents the ERC for the unsystematic 
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Rjt  is raw return accumulated over the window surrounding 
12) Lopez and Rees (2002) used the median unexpected earnings for the past four 
quarters as a proxy. For robustness of the result, I also used various variables for 
the systematic portion of earnings surprise including last earnings surprise. The 
result was qualitatively very similar.
13) I include year dummy variables to control for the year effects. The results are 
qualitatively very similar with or without year dummy variables.
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the date of earnings release for firmj at timet; 
Rmt       is value-weighted market return accumulated over the 
window surrounding the announcement date at timet
CARjt  Rjt − Rmt; 
essys:  systematic earnings surprise 
 = mean of earnings surprise for the past four quarters; 
esunsys:  unsystematic earnings surprise 
 =  earnings surprise - mean of earnings surprise for the past 
four quarters; 
LMVjt  is logarithm of market value for firmj at timet; 
FLVjt  is ratio of total assets to the book value of common equity 
for firmj at timet;
MBjt  is ratio of market to the book value of common equity for 
firmj at timet.
dq is a dummy variable for portfolio Pq
On the basis of the above, I examine whether and how severely 
the market penalizes firms when the MBE pattern is broken if ERCs 
reveal increasing patterns in regression 2. In other words, ERCs 
are estimated when the firms miss analysts’ forecasts for the first 
time. If the market’s rewards are systematically associated with 
the patterns, the premium will dissipate after the pattern of MBE 
is broken conditional on the news of missing analysts’ forecasts 
being unexpected by the market. In such a case, I predict that 
ERCs will show increasing patterns for the firms’ portfolios and 
the coefficients will be statistically significant. On the other hand, 
it is well known that many firms preannounce bad news before 
an earnings announcement when they know they will not be able 
to meet analysts’ forecasts. More often than not, the bad news is 
incorporated in the price around the preannouncement date. If the 
market has foresight of the bad news before the date of the earnings 
announcement, the pattern of incremental ERCs may not appear. 
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Rjt+1  is raw return accumulated over the window surrounding 
the date of earnings release for firmj at timet+1; 
Rmt+1      is value-weighted market return accumulated over the 
window surrounding the announcement date at timet+1
CARjt+1  Rjt+1 − Rmt+1; 
essys:  systematic earnings surprise 
 = mean of earnings surprise for the past four quarters; 
esunsys:  unsystematic earnings surprise 
 =  earnings surprise - mean of earnings surprise for the 
past four quarters; 
LMVjt+1  is logarithm of market value for firmj at timet+1; 
FLVjt+1  is ratio of total assets to the book value of common equity 
for firmj at timet+1;
MBjt+1  is ratio of market to the book value of common equity for 
firmj at timet+1.
dq is a dummy variable for portfolio Pq
I also examine the degree to which the market’s reaction to MBE 
has changed after the accounting scandals of the early 2000s and 
the subsequent introduction of a new regulatory environment 
including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act14) (regression equation 3). An 
enhanced regulatory environment is likely to have militated the 
managers’ discretionary behavior towards the reliance on earnings 
and forecasts management. If companies’ propensity for behavior 
avoiding missing earnings expectation dissipated in the post-
scandal period due to enhanced scrutiny on earnings and forecasts 
management, the market would become less skeptical of firms 
showing the MBE pattern. In other words, the premium assigned 
to MBE pattern would be stronger. In such case, the coefficients on 
essyspost and esunsyspost would be significantly positive. Conversely, if 
the market participants became more skeptical of the patterns of 
MBE due to tightened accounting regulation and enhanced market 
transparency, the market’s premium placed on the coefficients 
essyspost and esunsyspost would be insignificant.
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+ ∗ + ∗ + ∗ +14) This subsample includes the firms which managed to meet or beat analysts’ fore-
casts at least 4 consecutive quarters. I also conducted the same analysis extend-
ing the MBE period. The result was qualitatively similar. 
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essyspost:  systematic earnings surprise in post-SOX 
 = mean of earnings surprise for the past four quarters; 
esunsyspost: unsystematic earnings surprise in post-SOX 
 =  earnings surprise - mean of earnings surprise for the 
past four quarters. 
DATA, SAMPLE SELECTioN AND DESCRiPTiVE STATiSTiCS
Several different databases were used to obtain data necessary 
for this research. First, Compustat research files served as a source 
of earnings per share (earnings per share excluding extraordinary 
items), book value, total assets, and number of shares. The earnings 
announcement dates were taken from the Compustat Quarterly 
file. The data from Compustat cover the years 1984 through 2007. 
Second, stock returns, market returns, and prices were taken from 
2007 CRSP Daily return file and the information available from 
CRSP was also used in computing market adjusted return. The 
data recorded one day after the day of earnings announcement were 
used. Third, earnings per share and analysts’ forecasts were culled 
from the 2007 I/B/E/S database. When the analysts’ forecast data 
follow the fully diluted basis (I/B/E/S uses either a primary or fully 
diluted basis for reporting analysts’ forecasts), I/B/E/S dilution 
factors are used to convert the data to the primary basis. Besides 
that, other information such as the number of shares outstanding, 
long term debt, trading volume, returns, prices, book value as well 
as earnings needed for the computation of risk characteristics were 
drawn from both CRSP and Compustat data.
Before employed in the study, all per share variables were 
adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends using Compustat 
Adjustment factors, and additional data requirements were also 
imposed to compute earnings response coefficient. Extreme 
values of earnings surprise and abnormal returns, which might 
become a potential source of distortions, were removed from the 
sample. The top and bottom one percentile of observations based 
on abnormal returns as well as the top one percentile based upon 
earnings surprise were treated in the same way, and thus were 
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Notes to table 2:
N: number of observations;
t denotes years;
es:  earnings surprise measured as the actual earnings per share (epsat ) less 
the most recent mean forecast (eps ft  ) prior to the earnings announcement 
of the quarter from the I/B/E/S database (epsat  – eps 
f
t  ); 
essys: systematic earnings surprise 
 = mean of earnings surprise for the past 4 quarters; 
esunsys: unsystematic earnings surprise
 = earnings surprise - mean of earnings surprise for the past 4 quarters; 
CAR:  market adjusted return calculated as cumulative return less the 
cumulative equally weighted market return over the selected window;
CAR−1~+1  market adjusted return calculated over a three-day window beginning 
one day before the announcement day and ending one day after earnings 
announcement; 
CAR−3~+1  market adjusted return calculated over a five-day window beginning three 
days before the announcement day and ending one day after earnings 
announcement;
CAR−7~+1  market adjusted return calculated over a nine-day window beginning seven 
days before the announcement day and ending one day after earnings 
announcement;
Pt-1 beginning-of-period price per share.
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also eliminated. After necessary modifications, a total of 94,296 
quarterly observations was achieved. Descriptive statistics of the 
variables used for the estimation of the earnings response coefficient 
are summarized in table 2. Covering over 24 years, the number 
of observations shows an increase from 196 in 1984 to 4,053 
observations recorded in 2007. Looking at table 2 more closely, 
we can notice temporal changes of earnings surprises (ES). While 
monotonically decreasing in the 1980s, during the 1990s ES were 
relatively stable, with generally increasing pattern from the late 
1990s to the early 2000s.15) It is also apparent that in comparison 
to the 1990s, the ES in the 1980s were greater, which is a finding 
consistent with recent studies. The same development can be also 
observed looking at the mean ES showing general decrease. 
Descriptive statistics for portfolio Pq can be found in table 3 
comprising the data of all MBE realizing firms. The observations 
are divided into groups according to the number of times the firms 
achieved consecutive MBE; firms which realize MBE more than ten 
consecutive times are included in portfolio P10. As a firm continues 
to MBE, we can observe the pattern of decreasing mean ES as well 
as market adjusted returns. 
All figures illustrating the findings support the hypothesis that 
managers engage in earnings and/or forecast management to 
ensure consecutive MBE. Figure 1 displays a histogram showing 
distribution of ES, by which it is scaled to form equal-width 
partitions. Looking at the graph, it is apparent that small positive 
errors are more frequent than the large ones; a tendency, which 
becomes more pronounced with an increasing Pq pattern. One 
possible line of interpretation is that managers prefer to achieve or 
slightly beat analysts’ forecast rather than exceed the forecasted 
number by a significant amount. This reasoning is supported by the 
finding that about 45% of observations in P10 belong to the interval 
with the smallest positive ES. However, the same observation can be 
also interpreted in an alternative way suggesting that with persistent 
MBE analysts increase their expectations due to the increased 
optimism about the firm’s future business results. 
15) Kothari (2000) notes that decline in analysts’ optimism is due to: (1) analysts’ 
learning from past biases; (2) incentive change; and (3) use of data in recent re-
search that has better quality and suffers less from survivor biases or selection 
biases. Conversely, Richardson et al. (2000) find that the bias has recently turned 
from optimism to pessimism.
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Paying close attention to the incentives managers have to 
achieve analysts’ forecast, Payne and Robb (2000) and Matsumoto 
(2002) arrived at the conclusion that reported earnings and/
or forecasts may be manipulated by managers in an attempt to 












































































































Notes to table 3:
ERC: earnings Response Coefficient;  
N: number of observations;
t denotes years;
es:  earnings surprise measured as the actual earnings per share (epsat ) 
less the most recent mean forecast (eps ft  ) prior to the earnings 
announcement of the quarter from the I/B/E/S database (epsat  – 
eps ft  ); 
essys: systematic earnings surprise 
 = mean of earnings surprise for the past 4 quarters; 
esunsys: unsystematic earnings surprise
 =  earnings surprise - mean of earnings surprise for the past 4 
quarters; 
CAR:  market adjusted return calculated as cumulative return less the 
cumulative equally weighted market return over the selected window;
CAR−1~+1  market adjusted return calculated over a three-day window beginning 
one day before the announcement day and ending one day after 
earnings announcement; 
CAR−3~+1  market adjusted return calculated over a five-day window beginning 
three days before the announcement day and ending one day after 
earnings announcement;
CAR−7~+1  market adjusted return calculated over a nine-day window beginning 
seven days before the announcement day and ending one day after 
earnings announcement;
Pt-1 beginning-of-period price per share.
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achieve small positive earnings surprises to sustain persistent MBE, 
also supported by the results of Burgstahler and Eames (1999) 
and DeGeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999). On the other hand, 
Richardson et al. (2000) and Matsumoto (2002) also suggest that 
firms with greater incentives to avoid earnings disappointment 
tend to receive pessimistic forecasts more frequently than others, 
the most important factors influencing forecast pessimism being 
issuance of new equity, growth, market-to-book ratios, size, profit, 
and litigation risk.16)
The phenomenon of unusually high frequency of small MBE is 
more pronounced as Pq increases. About quarter of P10 belongs to the 
smallest group suggesting that managers prefer to reach or slightly 
exceed analysts’ forecasts, especially when they have met or beaten 
analysts’ forecasts for multiple periods. An alternative interpretation 
is that as a firm continues to MBE, analysts become more optimistic 
and increase their earnings expectations for firms that repeatedly 
achieve MBE. Cohen (1991) noted the difficulty of meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts for multiple periods; analysts seem to increase 
earnings expectations for firms with a greater tendency for MBE. 
The unusually high frequency of small positive earnings surprises 
for firms that repeatedly achieve MBE can be regarded as evidence 
of earnings and/or forecast management. Payne and Robb (2000) 
and Matsumoto (2002) examine the incentives for managers to 
achieve earnings figures given in analysts’ forecasts. For example, 
the conditional probability of MBE in the next period given a firm’s 
MBE in the current period monotonically increases from a low of 
26.1% in P2 to a high of 75.4% in P9 in 1990’s.
17) In other words, 
75.4% of firms in P8 will continue to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts 
in the next period. These results suggest that managers may 
manipulate reported earnings and/or analysts’ forecasts in such a 
way as to generate small positive surprises in order to continue the 
MBE pattern (Burgstahler and Eames 1999; DeGeorge, Patel, and 
Zeckhauser 1999). 
The left graph of Figure 1 shows a histogram of the earnings 
surprise variable scaled by earnings. The observations are sorted 
on the earnings surprise to form equal-width partitions.  The graph 
16) The association between firm characteristics and MBE pattern is documented by 
Table 7.
17) Not tabulated.
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suggests that large positive earnings surprises declined over the 
1990’s, and that small positive errors are more frequent than large 
positive errors. Interestingly, while the proportion of small positive 
errors increased in the pre-SOX period, in the post-SOX period it 
has decreased. This finding may be consistent with the argument 
that managers’ propensity to earnings or forecasts management to 
achieve small MBE is less salient in the post-scandal period since 




Divided into two parts, the following section summarizes the 
results of the study. The first subsection is dedicated to the 
earnings response coefficients and related issues, accompanied by 
the findings concerning the comparison of the pre-SOX and post-
SOX period. The second subpart deals with the topic of firms’ 
characteristics following the division into five main categories. 
Earnings response coefficients were used to test the association 
between risk and MBE patterns. I expected ERCs to increase with 
a firm’s MBE pattern, and the firms with a greater tendency for 
MBE to have larger coefficients than those less likely to MBE. 
Moreover, I also asked whether the market is efficient in recognition 
Figure 1.
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of systematic behavior of habitual MBE firms. The results from 
Regression (1) for portfolio Pq, which were used to examine this 
issue, are summarized in table 4. The table provides evidence that 
the market rewards firms with persistent MBE. While the ERCs 
are estimated using three different windows—three days, five days, 
and nine days, market reaction to the unsystematic portion of the 
earnings surprise is captured by esunsys.18) The increasing pattern of 
ERC may imply decreasing pattern of firms specific risk,19) which can 
be interpreted as a stronger reaction of the market to the earnings 
surprise for firms with a greater tendency for MBE in comparison to 
the firms with a smaller MBE tendency.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that an efficient market systematically 
discounts the expected portions of earnings surprise (Pulliam 
1999; Vickers 1999). According to my hypothesis, most slope 
coefficients on the systematic portion should not be significantly 
different from zero. In line with that, table 4 documents that the 
coefficient on the systematic components of earnings surprise are 
generally insignificant and consistently smaller than those on the 
unsystematic components. This finding indicates that the market 
is able to estimate the earnings surprise for MBE firms efficiently. 
Panel A of table 4 shows that the earnings response coefficients 
increase in the predicted direction with the length of persistent 
MBE, as the estimated slope coefficient on esunsys monotonically 
increases from the low of 0.937 for P1 up to a high of 4.662 (0.937 + 
3.731) in P10.
20)
The above findings along with the results of regression equations 
(1) allow me to conclude that the ERCs increase with the MBE 
patterns. This notion is further supported by overall findings of 
the whole study and is consistent with the conclusions of Lopez 
18) The research was also conducted using other measuring windows. The results 
were qualitatively similar.
19) Kasznik and McNichols (2002) also argue that the market reward could reflect 
lower cost of capital.
20) I also examined ERC without splitting unexpected earnings into a systematic 
component of unexpected earnings and an unsystematic component of unex-
pected earnings. Apart from providing the evidence supporting the above expec-
tations, the untabulated findings also reveal monotonic increase of the estimated 
slope coefficient (three-day window surrounding earnings announcement day) 
from the low of 0.739 in P1 to 2.798 (0.739 + 2.059) in P10. I speculate that the re-
sult was caused by the stronger effect placed on the coefficients of unsystematic 
earnings surprises.
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and Rees (2002), who showed that firms with a historical tendency 
for MBE have larger ERCs.21) Nevertheless, it also seems that it is 
21)  As a supplemental analysis, I examined firms repeatedly missing analysts’ fore-
casts. It is hard to persistently miss expectations since bad news is frequently 
preannounced before the earnings announcement date. About 85% of firms do 
not repeatedly miss analysts’ forecasts for more than two consecutive quarters. 
Brown (1999) found that when a loss is reported, managers are indifferent to 
MBE. The result shows that investors do not seem to care about persistently 
missing analysts’ forecasts - unsurprising considering the fact that bad news is 
frequently released weeks before an earnings announcement date. It provides 
further evidence that firms prefer to realize MBE by earnings and/or forecast 
management. Not tabulated.
Table 4. Result of Regressions of Abnormal Return on Earnings Surprise: 
Last Earnings Surprise
This table presents the results of the regression testing firms’ meeting or 
beating analysts’ forecasts q consecutive quarters.
Panel A: -1~ 1 tEAD
+
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
αq 0.019 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
t 19.98 -4.31 -5.28 -3.61 -2.07 -1.53 -2.52 -1.79 -1.07 -3.15
βq 0.996 0.203 0.855 0.776 0.346 0.405 0.914 0.783 0.715 1.072
t 13.74 1.50 4.82 3.57 1.45 1.34 2.40 1.74 1.39 3.40
γq 0.937 0.271 0.814 0.955 1.398 2.695 2.227 2.743 3.105 3.731
t 13.70 2.20 5.34 5.30 5.42 7.49 5.43 5.66 5.41 10.46
LMV FLV MV Adj.R2
-0.001 0.000 0.000 0.016
t -6.60 -0.38 -0.40
Panel B: -3~ 1 tEAD
+
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
αq 0.025 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
t 23.21 -3.64 -4.03 -1.84 -2.27 -1.01 -2.53 -1.33 -0.84 -1.78
βq 1.295 0.350 0.563 0.491 0.599 0.550 1.848 0.527 0.967 1.039
t 16.11 2.33 2.85 2.05 2.25 1.64 4.38 1.06 1.69 2.98
γq 1.228 0.399 0.694 0.894 1.461 2.618 3.014 2.412 2.605 3.674
t 16.19 2.89 4.09 4.48 5.09 6.53 6.62 4.51 4.07 9.32
LMV FLV MV Adj.R2
-0.002 0.000 0.000 0.0191
t -10.26 -0.92 0.16
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the strong reward of the market embedded in the coefficients on 
the unsystematic components of earnings surprise which implies 
the significant pattern in table 4. This indicates that the market 
undoubtedly predicts MBE persistence and efficiently reacts to the 
earnings surprise according to the anticipation. 
Table 4. Continued
Panel C: -7~ 1 tEAD
+
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
αq 0.030 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002
t 23.63 -3.26 -3.99 -1.10 -1.10 -0.68 -1.95 -1.83 -0.61 -1.51
βq 1.549 0.379 0.647 0.826 -0.205 0.723 2.183 0.430 0.220 1.565
t 16.21 2.13 2.79 2.92 -0.64 1.90 4.39 0.72 0.33 3.77
γq 1.466 0.434 0.776 0.910 1.299 2.230 3.393 2.778 3.034 3.923
t 16.32 2.68 3.85 3.86 3.80 4.73 6.32 4.36 4.02 8.41
LMV FLV MV Adj.R2
-0.002 0.000 0.000 0.0185
t -11.73 -2.21 1.47
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Rjt  is raw return accumulated over the window surrounding the date of 
earnings release for firmj at timet; 
Rmt       is value-weighted market return accumulated over the window 
surrounding the announcement date at timet
CARjt  Rjt − Rmt; 
essys:  systematic earnings surprise 
 = mean of earnings surprise for the past four quarters; 
esunsys:  unsystematic earnings surprise 
 =  earnings surprise - mean of earnings surprise for the past four 
quarters; 
LMVjt  is logarithm of market value for firmj at timet; 
FLVjt  is ratio of total assets to the book value of common equity for firmj at 
timet;
MBjt is ratio of market to the book value of common equity for firmj at timet.
dq is a dummy variable for portfolio Pq
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The ERCs in the situation of firm’s first failure to meet analysts’ 
forecast can be found in table 5. It is usual that companies try to 
preempt a large earnings disappointment by preannouncing the 
bad news. In such a case, the market responds to the bad news by 
price adjustment around the date that the information is revealed 
leading to a weaker reaction when the actual earnings are finally 
announced.22) Despite that, for firms with a greater tendency 
22) For example, Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther (1997) found that the majority of 
preannouncements are regarded as bad news. For example, on August 29, 2001, 
Table 5. Result of Regressions Abnormal Return on Earnings Surprise: 
First Earnings Shock 
This table presents the result of the regression testing firms’ first missing 
analysts’ forecasts  after  meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts q consecutive 
quarters. 
Panel A: -1~ 1 t 1EAD
+
+
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
αq 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003
t 5.16 0.93 3.05 2.94 3.60 1.73 1.12 1.58 0.74 3.38
βq 0.226 0.460 0.122 0.844 1.055 0.358 1.918 2.383 2.607 1.428
t 11.36 6.89 1.55 4.79 4.26 1.19 5.34 4.73 4.07 3.92
γq 0.262 0.472 0.373 0.904 1.477 0.801 1.407 2.786 2.740 2.867
t 13.73 8.59 5.99 8.81 9.44 4.96 6.23 8.91 6.82 12.05
LMV FLV MV Adj.R2
-0.001 0.000 0.000 0.0160
t -3.61 1.70 -2.08
Panel B: -3~ 1 t 1EAD
+
+
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
αq 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004
t 8.80 0.81 3.65 2.88 3.26 1.50 0.67 1.09 1.03 3.62
βq 0.281 0.512 0.059 1.012 1.323 1.283 2.530 3.176 2.829 1.567
t 12.55 6.8 0.68 5.16 4.84 3.8 6.07 5.65 3.99 3.88
γq 0.325 0.624 0.391 0.853 1.679 1.180 1.930 3.192 2.891 3.245
t 15.25 9.5 5.94 7.49 9.82 6.61 7.24 8.96 6.48 12.28
LMV FLV MV Adj.R2
-0.001 0.000 0.000 0.0180
-6.3 -1.07 1.04
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for MBE the reaction of the market is different. In general, the 
increasing estimated slope coefficients accompanying repeated 
Sun Microsystems Inc. warned that it would probably miss analysts’ forecasts in 
its first quarter, and lost 18 percent of its value within the next two days.
Table 5. Continued
Panel C: -7~ 1 t 1EAD
+
+
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
αq 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005
t 9.59 1.76 3.77 2.33 3.48 1.89 0.69 1.34 1.14 4.25
βq 0.329 0.569 0.102 1.355 1.765 1.490 2.727 3.289 3.058 1.841
t 12.39 6.69 0.99 5.85 5.49 3.75 5.83 4.99 3.63 3.86
γq 0.380 0.549 0.595 1.051 1.867 1.201 2.107 3.415 3.360 3.713
t 14.88 7.65 7.04 7.75 9.26 5.70 7.17 8.24 6.43 11.90
LMV FLV MV Adj.R2
-0.001 0.000 0.000 0.0171
t -7.57 -1.43 1.22
Notes to table 5:
10 10
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Rjt+1  is raw return accumulated over the window surrounding the date of 
earnings release for firmj at timet+1; 
Rmt+1   is value-weighted market return accumulated over the window 
surrounding the announcement date at timet+1
CARjt+1  Rjt+1 − Rmt+1; 
essys:  systematic earnings surprise 
 = mean of earnings surprise for the past four quarters; 
esunsys:  unsystematic earnings surprise 
 =  earnings surprise - mean of earnings surprise for the past four 
quarters; 
LMVjt+1  is logarithm of market value for firmj at timet+1; 
FLVjt+1  is ratio of total assets to the book value of common equity for firmj at 
timet+1;
MBjt+1  is ratio of market to the book value of common equity for firmj at 
timet+1.
dq is a dummy variable for portfolio Pq
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Table 6. Result of Regressions of Abnormal Return on Earnings Surprise: 
Before and After the SOX 
This table presents the results of the regression testing the market reaction to 
earnings surprise before and after the accounting scandal period.
Variable
q ≤ 4 q > 4















































Notes to table 6:
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 (3)
Rjt  is raw return accumulated over the window surrounding the date of 
earnings release for firmj at timet; 
Rmt       is value-weighted market return accumulated over the window 
surrounding the announcement date at timet;
CARjt  Rjt − Rmt; 
Post dummy variable, equals 1 for the post-sox period. 
essys:  systematic earnings surprise 
 = mean of earnings surprise for the past four quarters; 
essyspost: systematic earnings surprise in post-SOX period
 = mean of earnings surprise for the past four quarters; 
esunsys:  unsystematic earnings surprise 
 =  earnings surprise - mean of earnings surprise for the past four 
quarters; 
esunsyspost: unsystematic earnings surprise in post-SOX period
 =  earnings surprise - mean of earnings surprise for the past four 
quarters. 
LMVjt  is logarithm of market value for firmj at timet; 
FLVjt  is ratio of total assets to the book value of common equity for firmj at 
timet;
MBjt  is ratio of market to the book value of common equity for firmj at 
timet.
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MBE achievements show that the firms with long MBE pattern are 
penalized more severely when they first miss market expectations. 
Table 5 provides evidence that the coefficients on the systematic 
components of earnings surprise are consistently smaller and less 
significant than those on the unsystematic ones. 
Finally, anecdotal evidence shows that in the post-scandal period 
stock market premium to the small MBE has disappeared, and the 
premium attached on beating estimates by a larger amount has 
diminished (Koh et al. 2007). Thus, to test whether the market’s 
reaction to persistent MBE has been affected by the major shift 
in the regulatory system, I split the persistent MBE sample into a 
pre-SOX and a post-SOX group. The persistent MBE subsample 
includes the firms that have successfully achieved MBE at least 
four consecutive quarters.23) Apart from other conventional findings, 
the results summarized in table 6 reveal that even though in the 
post-SOX period the stock market premium to MBE has decreased, 
it has not diminished completely. While in the pre-SOX group the 
premium on systematic earnings surprise for habitual beaters 
was 1.160, and the premium on unsystematic earnings surprise 
was 2.218, in the post-SOX period it stood at 0.718 and 1.917 
respectively. As for firms that achieved consecutive MBE four times 
or less, in the post-SOX period the premium on systematic earnings 
surprise dropped to 0.389 from 0.983 pre-SOX, and the premium 
on unsystematic earnings surprise decreased to 0.398 from 0.922 
pre-SOX. This comparison not only shows that the premium in 
the post-SOX period still exists, but it also implies that the market 
continues to reward persistent MBE firms, since for habitual MBE 
firms the premium is higher than for those with a shorter series of 
consecutive MBE. 
Firm Characteristics 
Despite numerous studies which deal with the phenomenon 
of MBE and suggest the penalization of firms missing market 
expectations, so far little is known about the characteristics of 
habitual MBE firms. Consequently, one of the aims of this study is 
to examine MBE firms’ characteristics, which are viewed as proxies 
23) I also used longer periods for the persistent MBE subsample. The result was 
qualitatively similar.
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for firm specific risk, growth, and/or persistence, and shed light 
on the way ERCs and MBE patterns are associated through them. 
Furthermore, this analysis also helps to reveal more about the 
firms’ motivation for persistent MBE achievement. For this purpose, 
I compare the characteristics of firms which repeatedly achieve 
MBE to those which do not. In addition to that, I also analyze the 
differences between MBE firms with longer and shorter patterns. 
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Notes to table 7: 
Mk. Cap.: market capitalization in millions; 
Avg. Vol.:   average $ volume previous year is calculated over the previous 
year; 
Disp.:     dispersion of analysts’ forecasts 
 = Standard Deviations of Analysts Forecasts
Consensus Median Forecasts
;
Std. Ret.:  standard deviation of daily returns, calculated over the previous 
year; 
Turn: average daily turnover, calculated over the previous year 
 = 
average $ volume
average number of shares 
;
LTG: long-term growth; 
Momentum: prior six-month-momentum; 
Beta:     five-year rolling beta; 
D/B:     long-term debt-to-book ratio; 
P/B:     price-to-book ratio;
Tobin’s q: Tobin’s q ratio = 
Liability Market Value of Equity
Total Assets
+
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Following the division into six different categories (liquidity and 
information, earnings variability, leverage, market volatility, other 
pricing anomalies, and equity valuation), the analysis related to the 
investigated characteristics listed in table 7 accompanied by the 
hypotheses and research findings is provided below.
As for the characteristics related to liquidity and information, 
in this study they are represented by two variables—market 
capitalization (Mk. Cap) and dollar trading volume (Avg. Vol). 
Based upon other existing studies (Bhushan 1989; Brown 1999; 
Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki 2000), analysts’ forecasts for large 
firms (Mk. Cap) were expected to be pessimistically biased, similarly 
to the firms with long strings of uninterrupted MBE. Brown (1999) 
documents that while habitual MBE firms are not only large in size, 
they even grow with additional MBE achievement. At the same time, 
he also shows the existence of optimistic bias on the side of small 
firms. If these statements hold, a positive relation between liquidity 
variables and the number of times of consecutive MBE should be 
found. Furthermore, there should be lower likelihood of smaller 
firms achieving persistent MBE and the same pattern for dollar 
trading volume (Avg. Vol) and the size variable should be detected. 
The results in the first two columns of table 7 document that the 
firms with persistent MBE are large in size (Mk. Cap), and grow with 
each additional success at achieving MBE. Moreover, the variable of 
dollar trading volume also displays positive correlation with Pq, thus 
showing the same evolution as the size variable. Apart from showing 
that the above outlined expectations materialized, these results also 
imply that larger firms have higher propensity to MBE and provide 
relatively more information to the market participants. 
In terms of the group of earnings variability characteristics, the 
variable of dispersion of analysts’ forecast (Disp) measuring the 
earnings variability was subjected to closer study. Previous studies 
(Clement, Frankel, and Miller 2000) document a negative association 
between the dispersion of analysts’ forecast and the magnitude of 
stock market response. Besides that, they also provide evidence of 
managers’ stronger incentive to MBE by increasing income in the 
situation of low dispersion of analysts’ forecast (Payne and Robb 
2000). In view of these findings, a negative association between Disp 
and Pq was anticipated in this study. 
This expectation is partially confirmed by the third column of 
table 7, which displays a lower dispersion of analysts’ forecast 
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for P10 when compared to P1 firms. Furthermore, the results also 
suggest that Disp gradually decreases with an MBE repetition. Table 
8 indicates that a negative correlation between Disp and Pq exists. 
Since the patterns in this variable are apparent, the findings related 
to this category provide sufficient evidence to sustain the hypothesis 
than managers of firms with lower forecast dispersion are more 
strongly motivated to MBE. 
The third group comprises characteristics regarding leverage. In 
this category, the study focuses on a debt-to-book (D/B) ratio. While 
the level of risk represented by financial leverage increases with 
the amount of debt in the capital structure of a firm, the amount of 
long-term debt increases with a consecutive MBE achievement on 
the account of the fact that an MBE company grows in size due to 
MBE repetition. Hence, a significant negative association between 
D/B and Pq was expected. The expectations are confirmed by the 
findings in table 8.  
As far as the variables capturing specific risk related to market 
volatility are concerned, the capital pricing model (Beta) and 
standard deviation of daily returns (Std. Ret) were employed. Using 
the 60-month return prior to the quarterly earnings announcement, 
I first computed Beta followed by Std. Ret computed over the 
previous year. Persistent MBE implies lower firm specific growth and 
less volatile returns of habitual MBE firms, which led me to expect 
a negative correlation between Beta, Std. Ret and Pq. Again, the data 
in table 8 show the existence of this kind of association. 
The next category of firms’ characteristics examined in the study 
deals with other pricing anomalies. This group is represented 
by four different variables, price-to-book ratio (P/B), analysts’ 
forecast of long term growth (LTG), average daily turnover for 
the previous year (Turn), and price momentum (Momentum). The 
previous literature claims the existence of a stronger incentive to 
MBE on the part of growth firms due to a much greater negative 
price response to earnings disappointment of growth (high P/B) 
stocks (Skinner and Sloan 2002). In addition to that, growth firms 
also display a stronger tendency to report small positive earnings 
surprise, as suggested by Brown (2001). Referring to these findings, 
growth firms should exhibit a stronger motivation to avoid earnings 
disappointment. In line with that, I also hypothesized there would 
be a positive association between P/B and Pq. Both expectations 
were confirmed, as shown by the results in table 8. The findings 
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Turn. LTG Momen. Beta D/B P/B
Mk. Cap. 0.278
Avg. Vol. 0.286 0.882
Disp. -0.080 -0.268 -0.114
Std. Ret. -0.051 -0.470 -0.199 0.000
Turn. 0.256 0.569 0.802 -0.019 -0.039
LTG 0.066 -0.214 -0.007 0.457 0.547 0.208
Momen. 0.154 0.059 -0.013 0.063 0.071 0.038 0.093
Beta -0.083 -0.174 -0.037 0.291 0.366 -0.061 0.206 -0.091
D/B -0.022 0.154 0.052 -0.208 -0.273 -0.070 -0.356 -0.046 -0.154
P/B 0.213 0.364 0.375 0.045 0.011 0.386 0.349 0.262 -0.118 -0.117
Tobin’s q 0.189 0.263 0.326 0.162 0.136 0.386 0.473 0.248 -0.021 -0.406 0.863
Notes to table 8: 
The triangular matrix reports Spearman correlations. The correlations are 
statistically significant at 1% level.
Mk. Cap.: market capitalization in millions; 
Pq portfolio q;
Avg. Vol.:  average $ volume previous year is calculated over the previous 
year; 
Disp.: dispersion of analysts’ forecasts 
 = 
Standard Deviations of Analysts Forecasts
Consensus Median Forecasts
;
Std. Ret.:  standard deviation of daily returns, calculated over the previous 
year; 
Turn:  average daily turnover, calculated over the previous year 
 = 
average $ volume
average number of shares 
;
LTG:     long-term growth; 
Momentum: prior six-month momentum; 
Beta: five-year rolling beta; 
D/B: long-term debt-to-book ratio; 
P/B: price-to-book ratio;
Tobin’s q: Tobin’s q ratio = 
Liability Market Value of Equity
Total Assets
+
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provide evidence of a significant increase in P/B with consecutive 
MBE, as well as growth firms’ having a stronger motivation to avoid 
failing to meet market expectations. The next variable, LTG, was 
also used as a proxy for a ‘growth’ stock. Confirmed by the study, I 
expected LTG to be positively correlated with Pq, which is consistent 
with the notion of growth firms having a stronger motivation to 
avoid earnings disappointment. As to Turn, I anticipated the variable 
to show positive association with Pq, implied by the expectation that 
firms that consistently MBE will have a higher turnover ratio. The 
patterns for these variables being apparent, the above expectations 
were confirmed by the analysis. To conclude this part, momentum 
of the prior six months (Momentum) was analyzed. I anticipated 
Momentum and Pq to be positively associated, as confirmed by the 
evidence presented in table 8. On average Momentum increases with 
higher Pq, and from the beginning of the pattern the evolution of 
the variable also indicates higher momentum of firms with longer 
strings of consecutive MBE. 
The last category is related to equity valuation. Tobin’s q 
represents a proxy for firms’ equity valuation. It is apparent that 
the increase of Tobin’s q with higher Pq implies the market rewards 
associated with the MBE pattern. 
Overall, the findings allow me to say that the expectations 
regarding firms’ characteristics are to large extent confirmed by the 
research. In summary, the results show that while Mk. Cap, LTG, 
Avg. Vol, Turn, P/B, and Momentum are positively correlated with 
the length of firms’ consecutive MBE, a negative association between 
MBE pattern and Disp, Std. Ret, D/B, and Beta has been found. 
Concluding Remarks
Though a plethora of studies documents evidence of earnings 
and/or forecast management, relatively little attention has been 
paid to how the market rewards the firms that exceed expectations 
conditional on a prior history of beating them. Helping to fill this 
gap, this paper provides extends research in the area of earnings 
and forecast management by identifying shared characteristics of 
firms that have achieved long strings of earnings statements either 
meeting or beating quarterly analysts forecasts. Such companies 
have enjoyed systematic patterns of market rewards associated 
with the MBE. Given that the market penalizes missing analysts’ 
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forecasts and rewards successful attempts to meet or beat them, 
the increasing tendency to achieve MBE is a rational response by 
managers. Perhaps surprisingly, the characteristics of habitual MBE 
firms and their association with concomitant market reactions have 
rarely been examined. 
This paper provides compelling evidence that ERCs are positively 
associated with the length of time of MBE after controlling for the 
systematic portions of earnings surprise. Consistent with anecdotal 
evidence, I found that the market seems to anticipate earnings 
surprise for habitual beaters. After controlling for the systematic 
portion of earnings surprise, earnings response coefficients are 
higher for firms that have a long history of MBE. 
In addition, I find significant evidence relating ERCs and 
the patterns of MBE after the original pattern is broken. The 
increasing estimated slope coefficients accompanying repeated 
MBE achievement imply that the firms with long MBE patterns are 
penalized more severely when they first miss market expectations. 
Apart from other conventional findings, I further document that 
even though the stock market premium to MBE has decreased in 
the post-SOX period, it still prevails. The results also show and that 
the market continues to reward habitual MBE firms in comparison 
to companies with shorter strings of MBE. 
I also examined the relation between MBE patterns and various 
firm characteristics that have been suggested as risk proxies 
and tried to discern any patterns in their behavior. Several 
characteristics exhibited a systematic relationship to the patterns. 
The results also include shortfalls which have important 
implications in so far as they help explain the association between 
firms’ incentives to MBE and the market’s reactions to earnings 
surprises. Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that the market price 
reaction is more negative towards negative earnings surprise than 
towards positive earnings surprises. Hence, high growth firms in 
particular want to avoid negative earning surprises. Findings related 
to firm characteristics may have implications for earnings and/
or forecast management. If the characteristics of firms indicate an 
incentive of managers to avoid earnings shortfall, managers will 
have a higher tendency to persistently engage in earnings and/
or forecast management. Thus, the firms will be less likely to show 
earnings disappointment and to suffer from negative market price 
reactions. Many recent studies report that firms engage in earnings 
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and/or forecast management for various reasons. For example, 
Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2000) found that pessimistic 
forecasts are more prevalent for firms with the highest incentives 
to avoid earnings disappointment. Forecast pessimism is more 
common for firms that are about to issue new equity, have higher 
growth and higher market-to-book ratios, and are larger and more 
profitable. 
Dealing with different aspects of MBE, this study helps to 
shed light on various issues related to this phenomenon and its 
association with firms’ characteristics, and also helps to ascertain 
the nature of the changes which happened in the financial markets 
after the SOX came into effect. I hope that apart from increasing our 
understanding of present financial environment, it can provide some 
guidance not only to the further researchers, but also practitioners 
operating in the financial markets. In the present world, where 
valid and reliable information is one of the key factors providing 
a competitive edge, businessmen are turning their attention to 
analyses and research papers on an increasing scale in hope to find 
answers or clues helping them solve the most pressing issues. This 
and other similar studies thus can help bridge the gap between 
academia and the business world and can serve as a tool to make 
sound investment decisions. 
Future research extending this study in several suggested 
directions would be beneficial. To begin with, it remains unclear how 
firms have succeeded in the “numbers game” against analysts, and 
various methods of earnings and/or forecast management employed 
by firms deserve further attention. Furthermore, since the cost of 
capital represents a key factor in valuation of companies’ stock 
in the stock exchange, it would be interesting to investigate the 
relationships between an MBE pattern and cost of capital. Another 
worthwhile study would be one that investigates the degree to which 
MBE patterns are attributable to earnings or forecast management. 
What is clear is that MBE patterns are significantly associated 
with each firm’s risk characteristics; however, the causality of 
the association remains ambiguous. In this regard, it would be 
beneficial if future research looked into earnings performance over 
a longer interval and, in particular focused on the performance of a 
firm once it has suffered its first earnings shortfall. As we can see 
from the example of Cisco, a company that had continued to beat 
analysts’ earnings estimates by exactly a penny for thirteen quarters 
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in a row until it finally missed the expectation resulting in complete 
disruption of the pattern, after their first shortfall firms seem to lose 
their original justification for maintaining the pattern. It shows that 
following an initial earnings shortfall, most firms engaging in MBE 
purposefully abandon their efforts to consistently beat analysts’ 
estimates by a small margin. Without further research, we can only 
speculate as to the causes leading to the change of firms’ behavior 
and the evolution of companies’ performance after the MBE pattern 
is first broken.
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